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I.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. ORDINANCES OR RULES
There

are

no

constitutional

provisions,

statutes,

ordinances or rules whose interpretation is believed to be solely
determinative of the outcome of this case.

1

II.

ARGUMENTS

A. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S MOTION B
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT AND WRONGFUL TERMINATION?
The first paragraph of the conclusion of Fred Meyer set
forth on page 25 of its brief specifically and clearly identifies
the main issue in this case and the reason that this issue was not
properly decided below.
Fred Meyer admits (See Fred Meyer brief, page 25) that
the Trial Court was to consider whether Fred Meyer violated its
employment

contract with Ms. Dubois.

Fred Meyer

admits an

employment contract exists, that the contract had substantive
requirements but that it did not have procedural requirements.
However, Fred Meyer then makes a substantial factual and
evidentiary burden error with which the Trial Court unfortunately
agreed, but which was wrong for purposes of a summary judgment
decision.

The contract in question admittedly had no procedural

requirements regarding an employee's termination.

Fred Meyer's

alleged factual showing, which was contested by Ms. Dubois (R. at
140-190), was found by the Trial Court as sufficient in an unstated
way, so the Court would not review whether Fred Meyer's factual
showing was reasonable, accurate or even consisted of false or
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imaginary facts and refused Ms. Dubois an evidentiary hearing as
to the reasonableness of such facts.
In its conclusion at page 25 of its brief, Fred Meyer
makes the allegation that "Fred Meyer clearly possessed sufficient
information

to

support

its

decision

to

terminate

Plaintiff.

...Fred Meyer's decision, properly supported, cannot be second
guessed by Utah Courts."
The above stated conclusion focuses on the reason that
the motion for summary judgment by Fred Meyer was improperly
granted by the Trial Court.
sufficient

information

Whether Fred Meyer clearly possessed

also is a question of

fact that was

contested by Ms. Dubois (R at 140-191), but was decided against
her without the taking of evidence.
The trial court imposed its own view, or Fred Meyer's,
of the facts in the motion for summary judgment, contrary to the
standard for a summary judgment which is that the court must view
the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
See Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 200 Utah Adv. Rep 15 (Utah
1992); and Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross, 208 Utah
Adv. Rep. 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Additionally, Fred Meyer claims
that its decision was "properly supported" and the court accepted
this position by ruling in Fred Meyer's favor regarding the
contested facts.
It is a question of fact as to whether anything was
properly supported by Fred Meyer or, as Ms. Dubois alleges, whether
the decision was not properly supported and all of the Fred Meyer
3

decision

making

employees

simply

went

along,

without

any

independent investigation, with one employee's improperly supported
decision. All Fred Meyer's employees except one relied on hearsay
for their decision to terminate.

Then these disputed issues of

fact were decided in the moving party's favor (Fred Meyer's) by the
Trial Court.

This is a violation of the standard of summary

judgment motions and is reversible error.
A careful review of the order entered by the Trial Court
(R. at 312-315) clearly indicates that several of its findings are
based upon the court viewing contested evidence and resolving that
evidence in favor of the moving party. See specifically paragraphs
1, 3, and 4

(R. at 313).

The Trial Court was wrongly convinced by Fred Meyer that
the obligation of the court in reviewing an employee's alleged
wrongful termination is not to provide an employee the opportunity
to have the facts of the decision to terminate litigated, but
rather to create a new legal standard whereby the employer prevails
if it claims it has made a "reasonable" investigation of the
circumstances.

Fred Meyer would have this legal standard hold,

that if an employer makes such an allegation, of

"reasonable

inquiry", the trial court will ignore the facts and accept the
investigation of the employer at face value, whether reasonable or
not,

and

without

permitting

the

reasonableness

of

that

investigation to be submitted to a finder of fact.
Fred Meyer relies on the Russell v. Ogden, Union Ry &
Depot Co., 247 P.2d 257 (Utah 1952), case to support its decision.
4

That case does not make the finding argued by Fred Meyer.

In the

Russell case, the court found that a due process hearing had
occurred prior to making the termination decision at which hearing
evidence was presented to an impartial finder of fact.
hearing

ever

occurred

in the

extant

case

and

No such

therefore

no

similarity with the Russell case exists.
Fred Meyer admits this is the case on page 14 of its
brief and makes the unjustifiable, and nonsensical leap that the
employer's investigating employee(s) can be the "impartial" trier
of fact for due process purposes and somehow make an impartial
decision.

Fred Meyer argues that its investigating employees are

the ones who conducted the fair and impartial hearing and that Ms.
Dubois had no right to challenge their findings in front of an
impartial hearing officer.

Nothing could be more unfair.

The arguments Fred Meyer sets forth on pages 14 and 15
of its brief are so laced with contested facts and procedural
unfairness or at the very least incompleteness, that to permit the
trial court decision to stand in this case would create substantive
law in the State of Utah that is both procedurally unsound and
fundamentally unfair as to a person's due process rights to have
their claims heard by a fair and impartial finder of fact.
constitution of the State of Utah does not permit this.
Constitution, Article 1, Section 7.

The

See Utah

Of course Fred Meyer wishes

that no employee would have access to a finder of fact relative to
a decision to terminate under its employee contracts.
employer in the world wants the same decision.
5

Every

If this Utah court

makes such a decision, it will be a tragic day for the meager
workers rights that do exist in our state.
Just the citing of all the facts that have to be agreed
upon, as set forth on pages 15 through 17 of Fred Meyer's brief,
as well as those set forth and argued by Ms. Dubois (R. at 140-190)
indicate a substantial number of contested facts which the trial
court decided completely in the moving party's favor.

Ms. Dubois

is at least entitled to have a fair and impartial hearing in front
of an independent finder of fact to determine if the Fred Meyer
investigation was reasonable.

If it was not reasonable, she was

wrongfully terminated and her claims should be compensated.

To

deny her the opportunity to prove that the investigation and
actions of Fred Meyer were unreasonable is a fundamental denial of
Ms. Dubois rights of due process, her rights under any reasonable
reading of the contract drafted by Fred Meyer and should not be
permitted.

B. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S MOTION B
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIM OF
INTENTIONAL
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BASED SOLELY ON THE GROUNDS SET
FORTH IN THE BRIEF OF FRED MEYER?
In this summary judgment proceeding, Fred Meyer argues
the contested facts of the case, claiming that they clearly show
there is neither outrageous nor intolerable conduct on their part.
See Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985), and Samms v.
Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961).
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The Trial Court accepted the

views of Fred Meyer regarding the myriad contested facts in making
it's decision to dismiss.

Without viewing the facts in the light

most favorable to the Plaintiff (the non-moving party) and making
specific findings on those issues, the Plaintiff has no way of
presenting her case to an independent finder of fact to determine
if there was sufficient evidence to go to a jury. All that exists
is the record of contested facts submitted in the respective
memoranda of each party.
All of the facts upon which Fred Meyer relied in making
its termination decision, except those stated by Mr. Jones, are
based

upon

inadmissible

hearsay

evidence

(R.

at

140-190).

Therefore, the decision to dismiss her was not based upon a
reasonable investigation, if the facts are viewed in the light most
favorable to Ms. Dubois.
In fact, Fred Meyer came up with an after the fact
explanation of a "shell" computer which was never presented in its
termination decision to Ms. Dubois (R. at 141-144) to cover up the
real reason why Ms. Dubois was terminated, whatever that reason
was.

The court must be careful not to subsume such claims into

other related claims. See Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc. 200
Utah Adv. Rep 15, 19 (Utah 1992).
Not permitting Ms. Dubois' case to be heard by an
independent finder of fact denies her the opportunity to have a
finder

of

fact determine

outrageous and extreme.

if the

conduct

of Fred Meyer was

The Trial Court's suggestion that the

firing had to be some kind of pre-textual firing and evidence of
7

that was required is not a rule set forth in the cases of this
state and not in and of itself the only reason on which the
termination decision could have occurred.

Fred Meyer's actions

could have occurred simply to cover up the bad decisions of the
Fred Meyer employees, their failure to properly investigate or
failure

to

be

fundamentally

fair

investigating her side of the story.

towards

Ms.

Dubois

in

Reasonable minds could find

such actions to be outrageous behavior on Fred Meyer's part towards
Ms. Dubois, and could be sufficient to meet the test of the cases
set forth above.

To deny Ms. Dubois the right to go to an

independent finder of fact on those issues again procedurally is
permitting the trial court to adopt the view of the facts most
favorable to the moving party versus the non-moving party, which
is a fundamental error in making summary judgment decisions. See
Russell v. Thomson, supra.

C. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S MOTION B
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE
IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING REGARDING
THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WITH FRED MEYER?
This specific issue deals with whether or not an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in Utah relative to
those provisions that do exist under an implied-in-fact employment
contract.
case.

Such an agreement has been admitted to exist in this

The question is does Fred Meyer have an obligation to act

in good faith and deal fairly relative to the terms of an
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employment agreement regarding termination, and is there a specific
cause of action in Utah for such in Utah.

This is a very narrow

issue, specific to the facts of this case. It is a different issue
than that decided in the cases of Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 194 Utah
Adv. Rep 20 (Utah 1992), Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 55 (Utah
1991), Loose v. Nature-All Corp., 785 P.2d 1096 (Utah 1989) and
Sandstrom v. First Security Leasing Co., 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 18
(Utah 1992)
This issue is a legal decision and this Court must review
it for correctness.
The Trial Court likely justified its decision based on
the general rule of no implied covenants of good faith and fair
dealing in employment-at-will relationships under current Utah law.
However, in this case the fact that it is agreed and admitted by
Fred Meyer that an employment contract was in force between the
parties relative to the termination without notice provision of
such employment contract, creates an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing as to the particular provisions of a contract that
does in fact exist.

Otherwise, Fred Meyer can act with impunity

and in bad faith towards the contract and the employee would have
no recourse.

If the employee has no recourse for the bad faith

actions of the employer relative to the terms of an extent
employment contract, the employee effectively has no contract.
This would negate the existence of an employment agreement such as
the one present in this case.

Employees in the State of Utah

should not be treated so poorly.
9

D. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING FRED MEYER'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING MS. DUBOIS' CLAIM FOR SLANDER BASED
SOLELY ON THE GROUNDS SET FORTH IN THE BRIEF OF FRED MEYER?
In Fred Meyer's brief on this issue, it only reiterated
the fact that there is a contested factual basis for arguing that
there either was no conditional privilege or that there was malice
involved relative to the spreading of the termination information
about Ms. Dubois.
Ms.

Dubois

asserted

as facts

(R. at

140-190) that

information was communicated among various Fred Meyer employees
not necessarily relative to the decision to terminate Ms. Dubois.
In fact it was communicated even prior to the time that Ms. Dubois
had been able to present her side of the story in the termination
meeting.

(R. at 157)

If the decision to terminate her had been

made prior to the meeting or prior to gathering the facts, how
could it be a privileged communication, that she specifically was
going to be terminated because of this problem? The timing of Fred
Meyer is out of sequence for its argument and with the trial court
effectively denying Ms. Dubois' opportunity to prove to a finder
of

fact whether

reasonable, the

or

not

Trial

the

Court's

actions

to

decision

terminate

has

now

her

were

additionally

validated the communications about such decisions to terminate,
eventhough such communications were based upon facts that Ms.
Dubois both contests, but is unable to present to an independent
finder of fact.

This is a grossly unfair result.
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The Trial Court's decision on the issue of defamation,
coupled with its decision to deny Ms. Dubois the procedural due
process opportunity to contest Fred Meyer's wrongful termination,
have effectively totally and completely denied Ms. Dubois due
process to have an independent finder of fact review the actions
of Fred Meyer under the facts of this case. Ms. Dubois cannot put
on evidence before an independent fact finder to prove a lack of
reasonableness, to prove outrageous conduct, to prove bad faith or
prove lack of malice.

Employees clearly have absolutely no rights

in Utah, whether or not a contract exists.

III.

CONCLUSION

The Trial Court has created a legal and factual scenario
in the State of Utah whereby an employee can be terminated without
ever

having

termination

his

or

her

claims

of

unreasonableness

in

the

decision, based upon a contract, reviewed by an

independent finder of fact.

Utah now has given employers the

opportunity, with impunity, to spread among its various employees
whatever it wishes to spread in terms of statements concerning the
grounds for termination, without ever having such termination
grounds reviewed by an independent finder of fact and the employee
has no legal recourse to correct the situation.
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This is a sad

state of legal affairs relative to human, employee and due process
rights in our state.
This court must make a decision that an employee under
an employment agreement such as one that exists in this case at
least has the right to a fair and impartial hearing in front of an
independent

finder

of

fact as to the reasonableness

of the

employer's actions in its termination decisions. Without at least
that much of an opportunity to present his or her case, employees
will have no rights under any contracts.

If our Courts do not

provide that minimum opportunity, this Court should give up the
sham attempt to call such termination policies as exist in this
case, contracts, but rather call it something closer to reality,
such as a wish list an employer can use against their employees in
Utah when they desire to terminate them and want the last word.

DATED this J?%ftjiaY

of

Ayh^t

I

, 1993.

Respectfully submitted,

Bigelow
Attorney for Appellant
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